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Well, my opinion will not keep you out of jail, but I think it means, in addition to the places expressly listed, places where the public gathers for a particular function, and it is only a public gathering so long as the function is going on. One case and an AG opinion appear to support this.
THE CASE:
McDonalds is, by the way, the only restaurant to have been tested in the appellate courts of this state and approved as a "carry zone"!
State v. Burns, 200 Ga. App. 16 (1991)
Appellee was arrested at a McDonald's restaurant [and] . . . had a valid gun permit. . . . . [H]e was charged with carrying a deadly weapon to a public gathering (OCGA § 16-11-127). The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the accusation, stating that McDonald's was not a public gathering as contemplated under the statute, and the State appealed.
OCGA § 16-11-127(b) provides that a "public gathering" includes but is not limited to "athletic or sporting events, schools or school functions, churches or church functions, political rallies or functions, publicly owned or operated buildings, or establishments at which alcoholic beverages are sold for consumption on the premises." The State argues that the statute seeks to protect people from injury at public gatherings, caused by others who bring deadly weapons to such places and does not exclude an establishment such as McDonald's, which is a place where the public lawfully gathers. However, this broad interpretation equates "public gathering" to "public place" and blurs the distinction we must assume the legislature intended to make in specifically referring to gatherings in OCGA § 16-11-127 and by limiting its restriction to gatherings as opposed to proscribing the carrying of deadly weapons in public places as defined by OCGA § 16-1-3(15). We agree with appellee that such a construction would render licensing statutes unnecessary because of the potential of violating the statutes by carrying a weapon outside one's household, in public, where the possibility exists that people might gather around someone carrying a weapon. We have held that a conviction was authorized when a weapon was brought to a place where "people were present" (Jordan v. State, 166 Ga.App. 417(4), 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983) [the auto auction case, M.P.]), and it appears from reading subsection (b ) and giving the words their ordinary meaning that the statute should apply, in addition to the situations described therein, when people are gathered or will be gathered for a particular function and not when a weapon is carried lawfully to a public place, where people may gather. Accordingly, the focus is not on the "place" but on the "gathering" of people, and in our view, the court did not err in dismissing the accusation because appellee's possession of a weapon and mere presence in a public place did not constitute a violation of OCGA § 16- 11-127.
Judgment affirmed.
I bolded what I thought important.
" . . . for a particular function . . ." I think that is the most important language in the case. I really think the only difference between this case and Jordan, cited therein, is that Jordan was up to no good and Burns was just lawfully carrying when he ordered a cheeseburger. Since public gathering cases almost always involve a criminal, the case law is usually bad.
THE AG OPINION:
The attorney general relied on State v. Burns to answer a question submitted by a State Representative (District 35).
Link: http://www.state.ga.us/ago/read.cgi?sea ... val=U96-22
Therefore, it is my unofficial opinion that the "public gathering" law, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127, in addition to the five specific areas, focuses not on the place but the gathering of people, and that the prohibition against carrying a weapon applies to situations "when people are gathered or will be gathered for a particular function and not when a weapon is carried lawfully to a public place, where people may gather."
THE CASE:
McDonalds is, by the way, the only restaurant to have been tested in the appellate courts of this state and approved as a "carry zone"!
State v. Burns, 200 Ga. App. 16 (1991)
Appellee was arrested at a McDonald's restaurant [and] . . . had a valid gun permit. . . . . [H]e was charged with carrying a deadly weapon to a public gathering (OCGA § 16-11-127). The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the accusation, stating that McDonald's was not a public gathering as contemplated under the statute, and the State appealed.
OCGA § 16-11-127(b) provides that a "public gathering" includes but is not limited to "athletic or sporting events, schools or school functions, churches or church functions, political rallies or functions, publicly owned or operated buildings, or establishments at which alcoholic beverages are sold for consumption on the premises." The State argues that the statute seeks to protect people from injury at public gatherings, caused by others who bring deadly weapons to such places and does not exclude an establishment such as McDonald's, which is a place where the public lawfully gathers. However, this broad interpretation equates "public gathering" to "public place" and blurs the distinction we must assume the legislature intended to make in specifically referring to gatherings in OCGA § 16-11-127 and by limiting its restriction to gatherings as opposed to proscribing the carrying of deadly weapons in public places as defined by OCGA § 16-1-3(15). We agree with appellee that such a construction would render licensing statutes unnecessary because of the potential of violating the statutes by carrying a weapon outside one's household, in public, where the possibility exists that people might gather around someone carrying a weapon. We have held that a conviction was authorized when a weapon was brought to a place where "people were present" (Jordan v. State, 166 Ga.App. 417(4), 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983) [the auto auction case, M.P.]), and it appears from reading subsection (b ) and giving the words their ordinary meaning that the statute should apply, in addition to the situations described therein, when people are gathered or will be gathered for a particular function and not when a weapon is carried lawfully to a public place, where people may gather. Accordingly, the focus is not on the "place" but on the "gathering" of people, and in our view, the court did not err in dismissing the accusation because appellee's possession of a weapon and mere presence in a public place did not constitute a violation of OCGA § 16- 11-127.
Judgment affirmed.
I bolded what I thought important.
" . . . for a particular function . . ." I think that is the most important language in the case. I really think the only difference between this case and Jordan, cited therein, is that Jordan was up to no good and Burns was just lawfully carrying when he ordered a cheeseburger. Since public gathering cases almost always involve a criminal, the case law is usually bad.
THE AG OPINION:
The attorney general relied on State v. Burns to answer a question submitted by a State Representative (District 35).
Link: http://www.state.ga.us/ago/read.cgi?sea ... val=U96-22
Therefore, it is my unofficial opinion that the "public gathering" law, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127, in addition to the five specific areas, focuses not on the place but the gathering of people, and that the prohibition against carrying a weapon applies to situations "when people are gathered or will be gathered for a particular function and not when a weapon is carried lawfully to a public place, where people may gather."
