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The dissent argues the officer did have reasonable suspicion for an investigatory Terry stop, because, although possessing a handgun could be a legal concealed-carry, it could be illegal if Horton did not possess a FOID card (as required by statute), and the officer could have stopped Horton to investigate whether Horton was carrying the gun legally. This rationale leads down a dangerous path. By way of analogy, it is also illegal to drive a car without a valid license. If an officer makes eye contact with another motorist, and that motorist then turns onto another street, can the officer execute a traffic stop to verify that the motorist has a valid driver’s license? In that situation, we would say the police officer needed to have reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that this particular motorist did not have a valid license. Officer Hummons had no articulable facts to believe that Horton was carrying a firearm without a valid FOID card. For that matter, in our hypothetical, the officer stopping the motorist had more reasonable suspicion than Hummons, because the officer saw the motorist driving while Officer Hummons had a hunch that Horton was carrying a handgun based on his momentary view of an object in Horton’s waistband. Hummons originally testified that he saw a chrome metal object but could not tell what it was, but later, at trial, stated he thought the object was the butt of a handgun. Not only are the different versions incapable of reconciliation, but the original, closer-in-time testimony cannot be ignored; as such, there are no specific and articulable facts that justify a Terry stop.
The State theorizes that the officers’ approach and subsequent pursuit of Horton was justified based on “reasonable articulable suspicion,†under Terry. Id. But Terry does not apply as it pertains to investigative stops by police officers and not entry into a home absent probable cause. See People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 566-67 (2008) (entering residence “to merely conduct a Terry stop†violates fourth amendment). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime.†Id. at 563.
The dissent would hold the totality of the circumstances supports a finding of reasonable suspicion and the officer’s pursuit of Horton was reasonable. Infra, ¶ 88. But “the totality of the circumstances,†is no substitute for the “reasonable suspicion†of criminal wrongdoing, based on “specific and articulable facts†from which a determination can be made that the police officer’s action was not arbitrary or harassing. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In Terry, the police officers watched the defendant and another man for 10-12 minutes on a street corner. Something about the two men did not “look right†and aroused suspicion. The officer followed them and when they stopped to talk to a third man, the officer approached and identified himself. These facts sharply contrast with this case. The officers in Terry had ample time to observe the suspects while the police officer here was riding in a moving car and saw Horton for a moment, and immediately decided to stop him. The defendants in Terry were “pacing, peering, and conferring†in front of some stores; Horton stood in a front yard of a house that Hummons thought was Horton’s home.