Probably "last week" but first time for me.
Some foul language but it's bleeped out.
I disagree 100%. What someone does for a living should have ZERO bearing on how you're treated. If a police officer breaks a law they should be treated the exact same as I would be. If anything, police officers should be held to higher standards than we mere citizens.gunsmoker said:The state trooper was wrong for not showing the slightest bit of professional courtesy
Higher standards? Like they should be Tasered twice? :lol:wwomack said:I disagree 100%. What someone does for a living should have ZERO bearing on how you're treated. If a police officer breaks a law they should be treated the exact same as I would be. If anything, police officers should be held to higher standards than we mere citizens.gunsmoker said:The state trooper was wrong for not showing the slightest bit of professional courtesy
Smith v. Holeman, 212 Ga.App. 158, 441 S.E.2d 487 (1994).Holeman contends he is immune to the claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but we decline to so hold. If the arrest was lawful based on probable cause, he had the right to use that force reasonably necessary. If the arrest was unlawful, Smith had the right to resist the unlawful arrest with all force necessary. A police officer assaults a person by attempting an unlawful arrest with force. Even in a lawful arrest, an officer may not use more force than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. These claims cannot be determined until the lawfulness of the arrest is determined.
Wagner v. State, 206 Ga.App. 180, 424 S.E.2d 861 (1992).As the only evidence of antisocial conduct by appellant prior to arrest is his refusal to give his name, the jury had to conclude this was why he was arrested. But a mere refusal to identify oneself to a police officer is not a crime. We have held a refusal to identify oneself was obstruction where the officer personally observed defendant driving in a reckless manner, and where defendant was sought for arrest under a warrant. A person might commit obstruction where he knowingly and wilfully hinders an officer in investigating an offense committed by another. But there is no evidence appellant had committed an offense in this case or was hindering an investigation of an offense; therefore, his refusal to give his name could not have amounted to obstruction in the facts of this case. We note that appellant was not charged with obstruction by refusing to give his name to the police officer.
Whether a defendant impeded an officer in carrying out his lawful duties is usually a jury question, except where there is no conflict in the evidence and all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom demand a verdict of acquittal. The mere fact that someone calls the police is not probable cause. There was no evidence that appellant was unruly or threatened to breach the peace or even that the officer thought he was drunk. His sole offense was to refuse to give his name. This was not probable cause for arrest; therefore, the arrest was not lawful and appellant's physical resistance to arrest, which was the alleged obstruction, did not hinder the officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties. A verdict of acquittal was demanded under the evidence made out by the State.
Gainor v. Douglas County, Georgia, 59 F.Supp.2d 1259 (N.D.Ga. 1998).This case illustrates a very disturbing feature of Georgia law with regard to a suspect's right to resist arrest. If the defendant's initial seizure for refusing to provide identification were illegal, one would assume that his ability to file a civil suit or to have suppressed the contraband discovered as a result of that arrest would constitute the appropriate remedies for the illegal action of the police. One would not assume, however, that the defendant would have the right to engage in fisticuffs with the officer merely because he disagreed with the basis of the arrest. Yet, Georgia legal authority says just that.
In further reading on the subject I came across a SCOTUS case (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada) that gives the outline for the state (or locality) demanding identification. The justices decided that it is within the bounds of the USC, and does not violate the Forth and Fifth Amendments, so long as the officer has reasonable suspicion that a crime was/is/or about to take place.(B) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether alarm is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon the appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself...
Wagner was not "in a place at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity."Rammstein said:Back to my second question, how does Wagner v. State reconcile with the stop and identify law. Does it not come in to play because his arrest was unlawful or is the court simply choosing to disregard the law?
This statute codifies Terry, I think. :wink:. . . could one point to that as a defense that one not need to identify themselves during a Terry stop?